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ABSTRACT: Direct democracy is now being regarded as both an alternative of and an adjustment 
for representative constitutional democracy. Nevertheless, as is discussed in this article, direct 
democracy devices, particularly in those legal systems where no quorum is provided for validating 
referendums, can harm minorities. The analysis of “same-sex marriage referendums” can provide an 
emblematic example of how a minority groups can be easily outnumbered, when decisions are taken 
using direct popular voting.
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RESUMO: A democracia direta está sendo agora considerada tanto uma alternativa quanto um ajuste 
para a democracia constitucional representativa. Apesar disso, como é discutido neste artigo, os 
dispositivos de democracia direta, especialmente nos sistemas jurídicos em que não há quórum 
para validar referendos, podem prejudicar as minorias. A análise de “referendos de casamento entre 
pessoas do mesmo sexo” pode fornecer um exemplo emblemático de como grupos minoritários 
podem ser facilmente superados em número, quando as decisões são tomadas por meio do voto 
popular direto.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: democracia direta; referendo; revisão judicial; iniciativas populares; direitos das 
minorias; direitos fundamentais; casamento de pessoas do mesmo sexo; Direitos LGBT.
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this articleis to analyze whether the risk of compromising the 
fundamental rights of individuals belonging to minority groups is higher when 
direct democracy – in particular when no quorum is provided there for – is 
used to decide over laws/regulations granting minorities specific guarantees2.
1 Orcid: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8381-4776.
2 This is an updated version of a paper published in 2019. See, M. DI BARI, A majoritarian one-shot, a minority 
being shot. Direct democracy and the «counter-minoritarian dilemma», in Percorsi Costituzionali, n. 2, 2019, 
p. 571-592.
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Nowadays, after failing to achieve their goals through the legislature, 
it is common for minority groups to be granted rights through judicial 
activism, despite the mood of the elected majority3. This in turn, throws up 
the issue of the so-called counter-majoritarian dilemma4.
Hence, when initiatives or referendums to repeal a legislative reform 
or judicial decisions “pro minority rights” take place, they might be perceived 
as a way to reassert the power of the electoral majority against either the 
judiciary or the representative legislature5.
On several occasions in the last decade, referendums on socially 
delicate issues concerning minority groups have been resorted to. It is of 
utmost importance to investigate these “backlash phenomena”, in order to 
prevent the danger underpinning direct democracy. 
The first section of this contribution provides a brief and general 
overview of direct democracy devices. For the sake of brevity, and given the 
attention paid to case studies, the relation between direct democracy and 
populism will not be analyzed in detail.
In the second paragraph, case studies are examined to verify the 
outcomes of popular consultations, when the issue of same-sex marriage 
has been under ballots.
As will be shown in all the cases examined, popular consultation has 
resulted in a decision against minority groups (namely LBGT people). Given 
this scenario, is there a counter-minoritarian dilemma democratic states 
should deal with, when permitting the use of direct democracy to decide 
minorities’ rights?
Since this paper adopts a comparative approach to the issue of direct 
democracy’s possible negative outcomes, it is necessary to clarify – though 
briefly – the methodology adopted. This article’s approach will be functional6 
3 As Barack argues, since human rights are the true essence of democracy, rights of individuals, particularly 
those belonging to minority groups, “cannot be left only in the hands of the legislature and the executive, 
which, by their nature, reflect majority opinion”. A. Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a 
Supreme Court in a Democracy, in Harvard Law Review, v. 116, n. 16, 2002, p. 21.
4 A recent interesting analysis is provided by M. C. DORF, in The Majoritarian Difficulty and Theories of 
Constitutional Decision Making, in Journal of Constitutional Law, v. 13, n. 2, 2010, p. 283 ss.
5 T. DONOVAN, Direct democracy and campaign against minorities, in Minnesota Law Review, v. 97, 2013, 
p. 1739 ss.
6 R. Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in M. REIMANN, R. ZIMMERMAN(eds.), Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative law, 2006, p. 364 ss.; See, also, R. Michaels, Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction, in 
Michigan Journal of International Law, v. 27, n. 4, 2006, p. 1003-1069. As Van Hocke argues, “comparing 
178    ..........................................................................................................................RDP Nº 98 – Mar-Abr/2021 – ASSUNTO ESPECIAL
RDP, Brasília, Volume 18, n. 98, 176-198, mar./abr. 2021
to the extent this analysis will investigate direct democracy devices when 
used against specific social minorities, i.e. individuals belonging to the 
LGBT community.
The issue of same-sex marriage referendums will be investigated 
considering: (a) California and Taiwan as examples in which – despite ballot 
results – judicial review has favored the minoritarian social group; (b) Central 
and Eastern European countries7, namely Croatia, Romania, Slovenia, and 
Slovakia, as cases in which LGBT people’s rights have either been limited 
through popular voting, or an attempt for the same has been made, and 
courts have not intervened to stop these attempts.
In all the cases analyzed, one or more of the referendums8 have 
been conducted asking people to decide over same-sex marriage (or civil 
domestic law with the way the same area has been regulated in one or more countries has become almost 
compulsory in doctrinal legal research”. M. Van Hoecke, Methodology of Comparative Legal Research, in 
Law and Method, v. 12, 2015, p. 1. As Scarciglia argues “legal scholars might use comparison to do 
research, b lawmakers to elaborate new piece of legislation, judges to adjudicate”. R. SCARCIGLIA, Metodi 
e comparazione giuridica, Cedam, 2018, p.43.
7 See, N. PALAZZO and M. TOMASI, I referendum in materia di diritti delle coppie omosessuali: minoranze e 
vox populi, in Rivista di studi giuridici sull’orientamento sessuale e l’identità di genere GenIUS, n. 1, 2016, 
p. 89-103.
8 In 2015, in Ireland there has been a referendum to allow the introduction of same-sex marriage through 
a constitutional amendment. Surprisingly, the Irish referendum is the only example in which, when the 
population has been directly involved in the decision making process, this has turned into a positive result 
for LGBT people. It was surprising, given the relevance and influence of the catholic religion in Ireland, and 
considering that in Ireland, homosexuality was long conceived as a contagious disease even by Supreme 
judges ((Norris v. Attorney General, Supreme Court of Ireland, 22 April 1983). Indeed, according to sections 
61 and 62 of the Offences against the person Act of 1861, sexual activity between two men was considered 
a crime. The coming into force of the Irish Constitution did not make any difference on this specific issue 
until the decision of the 1988 European Court of Human Rights in Norris v. Ireland. Further, in 2006, in the 
case of Zappone& Gilligan v. Revenue Commissioners & Ors, the High Court denied recognition to a same-sex 
marriage celebrated in Canada (Zappone and Gilligan v. The Revenue Commissioners and Others [2006] IEHC 
404, p. 63. The full text of this decision can be found at https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/
Zappone-and-Gilligan-v.-Revenue-Commissioners-and-Others-High-Court-of-Ireland.pdf, last retrieved on 16 
September 2019). In this case, following the decision of the Revenue Commissioners to refuse a lesbian 
couple – married in British Columbia – tax allowances as a married couple, the plaintiffs sought to apply 
for judicial review, which the High Court of Ireland granted. Interestingly, Justice Dunne acknowledged that 
“the Constitution is a living instrument [and accepted] the arguments [...] to the effect that there is a 
difference between an examination of the Constitution in the context of ascertaining unenumerated rights 
and redefining a right which is implicit in the Constitution and which is clearly understood. [However] in 
this case the court is being asked to redefine marriage to mean something which it has never done to date”. 
The Court, referring to discrimination suffered by same-sex couples, “[hoped] that the legislative changes 
to ameliorate these difficulties will not be long in coming. Ultimately, it is for the legislature to determine 
the extent to which such changes should be made” (Zappone and Gilligan v. The Revenue Commissioners 
and Others [2006] IEHC 404, p. 63-69). In 2010, the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations 
of Cohabitants Act was introduced in the Irish legal system. This law provided same-sex partners almost the 
same rights and duties of married couples, and represented the first step towards equal treatment of partners 
regardless of their sexual orientation. In 2015, following a strong public debate on the possibility of opening 
the legal institution of marriage on a more inclusive basis, a constitutional referendum was conducted to 
modify art. 41 of the Irish Constitution. To modify the Irish Constitution, once a Bill has been presented by the 
Dáil Éireann, according to art. 46 of the Constitution, it is necessary for the proposal to being voted upon by 
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partnership) either to introduce a constitutional ban, or to prevent/allow 
the introduction of an ad hoc legislative/constitutional reform. The different 
cases will be presented from the early (2008) to the most recent (2019) 
popular consultation9.
In the concluding section, data will be discussed to explore to what 
extent direct democracy might affect the rights of minorities, and considering 
possible solutions to tackle what I call the democratic «counter-minoritarian 
dilemma».
1 Direct Democracy: theoretical moDels, open issues, anD the role of juDicial review
During general elections, individuals are asked to vote for a person who 
will represent them (acting on behalf), which is the basis of representative 
democracy. However, in the case of popular initiatives or referendums, 
there is the possibility for individuals to vote directly on a specific issue or 
policy, i.e., to exercise direct democracy10.
Thus, in very simple terms, while during elections it is a matter of 
“person-voting”, in the case of referendum, it is all about “issue-voting”11.
the majority of citizens (art. 47 of the Irish Constitution). On 29 August 2015, the Thirty-fourth Amendment 
of the Constitution (Marriage Equality) Actwas approved by the people with a turnout of 60,52 and a majority 
of 62,07%. This amendment has modified art. 41 introducing this new wording: “Marriage may be contracted 
in accordance with law by two persons without distinction as to their sex”. On October 2015, following 
the High Court’s decision concerning the dispute about the validity of the referendum result, the Marriage 
Act 2015 was signed into law. For an overview of the Irish case, see Y. MURPHY, The marriage equality 
referendum 2015, in Irish Political Studies, v. 31, n. 2, 2016, p. 315 ss.; J. A. ELKINK, Understanding 
the 2015 marriage referendum in Ireland: context, campaign, and conservative Ireland, in Irish Political 
Studies, v. 32, n. 3, 2017, p. 370 ss. D. AMRAM, Il cielo d’Irlanda si tinge di arcobaleno, in Rivista di 
studi giuridici sull’orientamento sessuale e l’identità di genere GenIUS, n. 2, 2015, p. 172-178; F. RYAN, 
Ireland’s Marriage Referendum: A Constitutional Perspective. in DPCE Online, v. 2015, n.2, p. 4 ss.
9 In 2017, in Australia, citizens have been involved in the so-called Australian Marriage Law Postal Survey, 
a national survey designed to understand citizens’ attitude towards the introduction of same-sex marriage in 
Australia. The survey was held through the postal service between 12 September and 7 November 2017. 
Unlike voting in elections and referendums, which is compulsory in Australia, responding to the survey was 
voluntary. This is why the Australian ballot is not considered in this analysis. As for the survey question, it was 
framed in these terms: “Should the law be changed to allow same-sex couples to marry?” The survey returned 
7,817,247 (61.6%) “Yes” responses and 4,873,987 (38.4%) “No” responses. An additional 36,686 (0.3%) 
responses were unclear and the total turnout was 12,727,920 (79.5%). See (last retrieved on 25.09.2019) 
https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/1800.0.
10 It is possible to list another instrument also for the electoral majority: the recall. In this last case, people might 
decide to remove the elected representative from office.
11 L. Morel, Referendum, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, 2012, p. 457 ss.
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When analyzing direct democracy instruments12, a distinction should 
be drawn between popular initiatives and referendum stricto sensu13. In 
fact, while in the first case, individuals are proponents (authors) of a new 
legislative measure/reform, in the latter, individuals vote on an existing legal 
text/proposal14.
The contemporary debate on direct democracy is mainly focused on 
how, and to what extent, a constitutional democratic system should rely 
on direct popular issue-voting, instead of preferring the classical decision-
making process carried on exclusively through representative democratic 
institutions15.
Citizens in a purely representative democratic system might exclusively 
decide which party or candidate to vote into office, having various cues and 
available information. Accordingly, elaborating an idea on which a party 
or candidate responds better to one’s political view might seem relatively 
simple. On the other hand, when it comes to direct democracy, matters 
of popular vote can range from complicated fiscal policy or infrastructure 
projects to moral politics or political integration ( European integration)16.
In this context, preference allocation is not so obvious. On the 
contrary, it may take considerable resources to understand complex issues 
and develop a preference.
12 According to some Swiss scholars, differences in direct democracy devices “can be classified by two 
main dimensions. The source of the proposition describes who controls the issues which are subject to 
a popular vote, or in other words who sets the political agenda. In the Swiss case, this can be either the 
government or the parliament or the citizens. The other dimension relates to who can call for a vote. This 
can be either through a constitutional requirement or it can be through collecting signature”. G. Luts, 
Switzerland: Citizens’ Initiatives as a Measure to Control the Political Agenda, in M. SETÄLÄ, T. SCHILLER. 
(eds.), Citizens’ Initiatives in Europe: Procedures and Consequences of Agenda-Setting by Citizens, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012, p. 20.
13 Terminology in this specific context might be confusing. Defining correctly what a referendum or a popular 
initiative is requires a deep analysis of these specific and different instruments of direct democracy. See, M. 
SUSKI, Bringing in the People: A Comparison of Constitutional Forms and Practices of the Referendum, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993, p.10.
14 For a comprehensive historical and comparative analysis, see M. QVORTRUP, Referendums Around the 
World, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018 E. PALICI DI SUNI ELISABETTA, E. GARCIA, M. ROGOFF, Gli istituti di 
democrazia diretta nel diritto comparato, Cedam, 2018.
15 E. De Marco,Democrazia in trasformazione: i nuovi orizzonti della democrazia diretta, in Federalismi.it, n. 1, 
2017, p. 3 ss.
16 M. Fatke, Participation and Political Equality in Direct Democracy: Educative Effect or Social Bias, in Swiss 
Political Science Review, v. 21, n. 1, 2014, p. 99-118; P. Selb, Supersized votes: ballot length, uncertainty, 
and choice in direct legislation elections, in Public Choice, v. 135, n. 3, 2008, p. 319-336; M. Kang, 
Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and “Disclosure 
Plus”in UCLA Law Review, v. 50, 2003, p. 1141-1188.
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Scandals associated with corruption and bad administration have 
led citizens to mistrust political parties and representative democratic 
institutions17. Direct democracy is seen as a possible way to overcome the 
“inability to respond to societal demands” of the political class18.
«Populism», a word that has always been perceived in a negative 
fashion, is now used with a positive connotation19 («the people rule!»). By 
distinguishing between “the people” and “the elite”, populism emphasizes 
the power of ‘common people’, ‘the sovereign nation’, as opposed to the 
liberal understanding of democracy and its main features20 (e.g., rule of law, 
checks and balances, the protection of minority rights).
Supporters of direct democracy believe that giving citizens the option 
to vote directly, even overruling previous decisions made by representatives, 
might be the right corrective tool in all cases where elected representatives 
fail to follow the electorate’s preferences21. Some scholars also believe 
that pushing direct democracy in terms of popular initiatives could allow 
policy makers to change their preferences based on popular will, before 
a legislature’s choice is annulled by a referendum22 (a sort of «saving-time 
device»).
On the other hand, according to the opponents of an extensive 
recourse to direct democracy, there is no evidence that a referendum or 
popular initiative can improve the quality of democracies23. Therefore, while 
elected representatives might be in a better position to aggregate preferences 
17 See T. GINSBURG, A. HUQ, How to Save a Constitutional Democracy, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
and London, 2018; G. ALLEGRI, A. STERPA, N. VICECONTE(eds.), Questioni costituzionali al tempo del 
populismo e del sovranismo, Editoriale Scientifica, Napoli, 2019; S. GARBEN, I. GOVAERE, P. NEMITZ 
(eds.), Critical Reflections on Constitutional Democracy in the European Union, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 
2019; M.A. GRABER, S. LEVINSON, and M. TUSHNET (eds.), Constitutional Democracy in Crisis?, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2019; W. Sadurski, Poland’s Constitutional Break-down, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2019.
18 See, G. Baldini, Populismo e democrazia rappresentativa in Europa, in Quaderni di Sociologia, v. 65, 2014, 
p. 11-29; N. Rossi, Giudici popolo e populismi, in Questione Giustizia, n. 1, 2019, p. 14 ss.; P. Serra, 
Populismo, democrazia e limiti del potere politico, in Questione Giustizia, n. 1, 2019, p. 55 ss.
19 S. MOHRENBERG, R. A. HUBER, T. FREYBURG, Love at First Sight? Populism and Direct Democracy, 
(March 1, 2018) available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3375589; J. G. MATSUSAKA, The Eclipse of 
Legislatures: Direct Democracy in the 21st Century, in Public Choice, v. 124, n. 1/2, 2005, p. 157-177.
20 H. KRIESI, The Populist Challenge, in West European Politics, v. 37, n. 2, 2014, p. 363 ss.
21 P. LE BIHAN, Popular Referendum and Electoral Accountability, in Political Science Research and Methods, 
v. 6, Issue n. 4, 2018, p. 715-731.
22 See, T. BESLEY, S. COATE, Issue Unbundling via Citizens’ Initiatives, in Quarterly Journal of Political 
Science, v. 3, 2008, p. 379-397; E. R. GERBER, Legislative response to the threat of popular initiatives, in 
American Journal of Political Science, v. 40, n. 1, 1996 p. 99-128.
23 L. MOREL, supra note 11, p. 457.
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and discuss properly the consequences of a given political choice of a new 
legislative measure, the «people» themselves tend to follow party lines 
and stereotypes24, instead of allocating preferences based on individual 
speculations.
Further, if popular initiatives or referendums become very frequent, 
popular participation tends to decrease25, to the extent that the outcome of 
direct democracy can become – de facto – the reflection of minority views 
(the proponents’ view) on a given subject.
To minimize the potential side effects of direct democracy, judicial 
review might play a role. Indeed, popular initiatives can be challenged in 
court through multiple ways. They can be challenged early to keep them 
off the ballot or later, after voters’ approval (as it will be shown through the 
analysis of selected case studies).
In the majority of legal systems26; judicial review mainly covers the 
process, i.e. it is about the rules to be respected: (a) in relation to the demand 
of a direct vote on a specific issue; (b) the campaigning process; (c) the rules 
pertaining the voting process itself,  in case of referendums whether there is 
a quorum or not, or in case of popular initiatives, whether the proposal must 
be written in general terms or as a bill ready for discussion.
In relation to its formulation, i.e. whether the wording of the proposal 
is clear enough, and whether it narrowly identifies a specific subject, a 
formal scrutiny may be required ( in Croatia27, California28).
As far as the asked question is concerned, judicial review might involve 
an evaluation of both the formal and the material validity of the question29. 
Material validity refers mainly to whether a referendum or popular initiative 
24 P. SELB, supra note 18, p. 323 ss.
25 S. CHAMBERS, Constitutional referendums and democratic deliberation, in M. MENDELSOHN, A. PARKIN 
(eds.), Citizens, Elites and Deliberation in Referendum Campaigns, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
26 See, M. FATIN-ROUGE STEFANINI. Le contrôle du référendum par la justice constitutionnelle, Presses 
universitaires d’Aix-Marseille Economica, 2004, p. 167 ss.
27 R. Podolnjak, Constitutional Reforms of Citizen-Initiated Referendum Causes of Different Outcomes in Slovenia 
and Croatia, in Revus, v. 26, 2015, p. 143 ss.
28 D. C. LEWIS, Direct Democracy and Minority Rights: Same-Sex Marriage Bans in the U.S. States, in Social 
Science Quarterly, v. 92, n. 2, 2011, p. 364 ss.; T. DONOVAN, supra note 3, p. 1746 ss.
29 See, K. PÓCZA (ed.), Constitutional Politics and the Judiciary, Routledge, Oxford, 2018; M. BELOV(ed.), 
Courts, Politics and Constitutional Law. Judicialization of Politics and Politicization of the Judiciary, 
1st Edition, Routledge, Oxford, 2019; C. LANDFRIED (ed.), Judicial power. How Constitutional Courts affect 
political transformations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019; E. GARCIA, E. PALICI DI SUNI, M. 
ROGOFF, supra note 3, p. 103 ss.
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covers a matter which is open to referendum, or the conformity of the 
popular proposal to the status quo, i.e. its compatibility with higher ranking 
legislation such as fundamental rights embedded in the Constitution or Bill 
of Rights30.
Oversight of direct democracy devices might be either automatic or 
compulsory, and might depend on which social actor is allowed to seize 
the authority in charge of reviewing the legitimacy of the proposal. In this 
respect, among the selected case studies, legal systems present different 
solutions. 
2 referenDums on same-sex marriage
The issue of legal recognition of same-sex couples has been widely 
and intensely debated in recent years.
In Europe as well as worldwide, very different solutions have been 
adopted to accommodate the demand for recognition of LGBT couples.
Nevertheless, while in many states same-sex partners can register or 
enter into civil partnership, only in some countries is it possible to find le 
«mariage pour tous», i.e. an equal legal recognition of partners regardless of 
their sexual orientation.
These social and legal developments never occur without creating 
social conflicts and opposition. Indeed, as it will be shown in the following 
subsection, describing each case study separately, in a number of occasions, 
legal measures – or judicial decisions – approving gay marriage have become 
an easy31 target for supporters of a traditional understanding of marriage.
30 An example is represented by the Slovakian Constitution. According to article 93, para. 3, the Constitution 
provides for the so-called «irrevocability clause» in the field of human rights. In other words, standards of 
human rights as set in the constitutional text cannot be reduced. “If the subject of the referendum would 
reduce human rights to such a degree that it would jeopardize the nature of the rule of law, such a referendum 
would not be constitutionally acceptable [...] In the Slovak Republic, by comparison, the inalterability of 
constitutional provisions guaranteeing fundamental rights and freedoms is protected primarily by Article 
12.1 of the Constitution (Basic rights and freedoms are irrevocable, inalienable, imprescriptible, and 
indefeasible.), but provisions with the same purpose are undoubtedly included also in Article 93.3 of the 
Constitution”. Slovakian Constitutional Court decision 2014-3-003, 28.12.2014 is available in English at: 
https://www.ustavnysud.sk/en/zakladne-pravne-dokumenty (last retrieved on 07.09.2019).
31 I use the adjective easy to emphasize how it has been quite simple for conservative parties to promote ballots 
on LGBT people’s rights and win their challenge, being always a very noise minority, yet greater than the LGBT 
minority.
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2.1 California (2008)
In the United States, marriage has been recognized as a legal 
institution (possibly) open to both heterosexual and homosexual couples, 
since 2015. The path of recognition has not been without obstacles and the 
role of the Supreme Court has been essential to override conflicts over this 
specific social issue. Indeed, in the landmark civil rights case of Obergefell v. 
Hodges32, the Supreme Court established once for all that the right to marry 
is open to same-sex partners in the same terms and conditions as opposite-
sex couples, given the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution33.
In 1993, the Hawaiian Supreme Court took the first prudent step 
towards the recognition of same-sex marriage in Baer34. In this case35, the 
court decided that in order to prevent same-sex partners from entering into 
marriage, the State should have demonstrated a compelling state interest36. 
This decision prompted an immediate social response by conservative 
political parties, which, following a struggle, engineered a state constitutional 
amendment to ban same-sex marriage before the introduction of same-sex 
marriage provisions by the legislature. Supporters of traditional marriage 
started popular initiatives in several of the fifty states against the enactment 
of same-sex marriage.
California represents an interesting and emblematic case in which 
direct democracy seems to have clashed with other constitutional constraints/
32 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015).
33 See. D. H .JHERMANN, Extending the Fundamental Right of Marriage to Same-Sex Couples: The United 
States Supreme Court Decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, in Indiana Law Review, v. 49, 2015; S. E: ISAACSON, 
Obergefell v. Hodges: The US Supreme Court Decides the Marriage Question, in Oxford Journal of Law and 
Religion, v. 4, n. 3, 2015. Another interesting analysis has been developed in a specific focus published by 
Rivista di studi giuridici sull’orientamento sessuale e l’identità di genere, GenIUS, n. 2, 2015: A. SPERTI: 
La sentenza Obergefell v. Hodges e lo storico riconoscimento del diritto al matrimonio per le coppie same- 
-sex negli Stati Uniti. Introduzione al Focus; S. CHRISS, D. C. WRIGHT: After Obergefell v. Hodges: the 
continuing battle over equal rights for sexual minorities in the United States; N. G. CEZZI: I dissensi nel caso 
Obergefell; R. Ibrido: L’argomento sociologico nella giurisprudenza costituzionale in materia diorientamento 
sessuale. Esperienze e casi.
34 Baer v. Lewin, 852 P.2d. 44 (Hawaii, 1993).
35 A similar, though not identical case has been decided by the Supreme Court of Alaska, namely Brause v. 
Bureau of Vital Statistic, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Superior Ct., Feb. 27, 1998). See, K. G. Clarkson, D. 
Coolidge, W. C. Duncan, The Alaska amendment: the people’s choice on the last frontier, in Alaska Law 
Review, v. 16, n. 2, 1999.
36 For an analysis of the levels of scrutiny in the United States, see E. CHEMERINSKY, The Rational Basis Test Is 
Constitutional (and Desirable), in Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy, v. 14, 2016, p. 401 ss.; R.H. 
Fallon, Strict Judicial scrutiny, in UCLA Law Review, v. 54, 2007, p. 1267 ss. Case n. 17-cv-1249, U.S.D.C. 
E.D.Pa, (Order), p. 63 ss.
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mechanisms and the judiciary had to play a crucial role in redefining the 
margin of popular sovereignty.
Firstly, in 2000, a banon same-sex marriage was introduced37through 
Proposition 22, which changed the California Family Code to formally define 
marriage in California as between a man and a woman. Proposition 22 was 
a statutory change (i.e. ordinary legislation) through initiative process, not a 
constitutional change through initiative process38.
Subsequently, the California Supreme Court ruled in a 4-3 decision39 
that laws directed at gays and lesbians were subject to strict scrutiny; 
thus, given that the right to marry is a fundamental right under article 1, 
section 7 of the Californian Constitution, barring same-sex marriage was 
unconstitutional. Therefore, several municipalities started issuing marriage 
licenses.
However, opponents of same-sex marriage had already begun their 
efforts to qualify Proposition 8, a popular initiative aimed at amending the 
Californian Constitution, i.e. imposing a ban on same-sex marriage stronger 
than the one provided by the Proposition 22. Proposition 8 was aimed at 
introducing a constitutional amendment, by adding to the Constitution the 
words ‘Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized 
in California’.
Again, the ballot was successful for its proponents. The turnout 
among eligible voters reached 50.1%, with “yes” prevailing 52.24% over 
the47.76% “no”40. Since amending the Californian Constitution requires a 
simple majority, the ban on same-sex marriage was constitutionali zed.
LGBT advocates immediately brought the case before the Supreme 
Court of California, aiming to stopping the ballot. According to the 
opponents of Proposition 8, this initiative was not meant to amend the 
37 Before Proposition 22, in California, there was a statute enacted in 1977 which prevented same-sex partners 
from getting married. Yet, the rulings delivered in other states concerning the admissibility of gay marriage (e.g. 
Hawaii, and Alaska) raised social concern in all US states and campaigns for the introduction of constitutional 
bans spread all over the federation.
38 This Proposition, provided by art. 2 of the California Constitution, has been voted on by 53,8 % of the voters, 
with ‘yes’ prevailing with a majority of 61,40%. See.
39 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P3d 384 (Cal. 2008). See, A. S. LEONARD, Backlash and Marriage Equality, in 
Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality, v. 2, n. 2, 2014.
40 Data can be analyzed in Supplement to the Statement of Vote Statewide Summary Propositions, available 
at https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2008-general/ssov/10-ballot-measures-statewide-summary-by-county.
pdf (last retrieved on 10/09/2019).
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Constitution – possibly allowed under art. 2 of the Californian Constitution 
– but represented a constitutional revision, which, on the contrary, is not 
allowed. Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court upheld Proposition 
8 by a majority of 6 to 1. Following the Court’s reasoning, while couples 
married before the ballot could remain married, unaffected by the new law, 
the ban on same-sex marriage could remain.
In 2010, this decision was repealed by the decision of the District 
Court for the Northern District of California in Perry v. Schwarzenegger41. 
Following Justice Walker reasoning, “An initiative measure adopted by the 
voters deserves great respect. [however] California’s obligation is to treat 
its citizens equally, not to «mandate [its] own moral code»”42. Hence, the 
principle of non-discrimination must prevail over moral considerations, 
and any attempt to undermine fundamental rights cannot be based on 
stereotypes.
Proponents of Proposition 8 challenged the District Court decision 
before the Supreme Court of the United States. However, this decision was 
not reversed, since Supreme Court Justices argued that the petitioners had 
not been persuasive in demonstrating they did not lack standing to appeal43. 
Therefore, though indirectly, the Supreme Court supported the lower court 
decision.
2.2 Croatia (2013)
The Croatian Constitution has undergone several revisions. While in 
1991, to run a referendum it was necessary to have the Parliament or the 
Head of State intervening, now, according to article 87.3 of the Croatian 
Constitution, citizens – at least a tenth of the electorate – might propose a 
constitutional or legislative referendum44. No quorum is needed to make the 
ballot valid, so each vote counts (art. 87.4 Croatian Constitution).
41 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.Supp.2d 921 (N.D.Cal. 2010). The full text of this decision is available at 
https://socialchangenyu.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/perry-v-schwarzenegger_ndca_2010.pdf (last retrieved 
on 10.09.2019). For an analysis of this case, see C.J. ROSKY, Perry v. Schwarzenegger and the Future of 
Same-Sex Marriage Law, in Arizona Law Review, v. 59, 2011.
42 Ibidem, p. 82.
43 See, S.L. KAFKER, A. D. RUSSCOL, Standing at a Constitutional Divide: Redefining State and Federal 
Requirements for Initiatives after Hollingsworth v. Perry, in Washington and Lee Law Review, v. 71, 2014; R. 
B. Siegel, Equality Divided The Supreme Court 2012 Term, in Harvard Law Review, v. 127, n. 1, 2013.
44 The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution was adopted for the first time in a decision taken directly by the 
electorate, on a specific proposal to amend the Constitution based on a popular initiative, i.e., based on a 
proposal to amend the Constitution submitted by voters.
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When Croatia was about to enter the European Union, social concern 
started to rise among conservative parties on the possibility of Croatia 
legalizing same-sex marriage, as it was happening in several other EU 
countries. Opponents (mainly the group named U ime obitelji, i.e. “on 
behalf of the family”), started a petition to run a constitutional referendum45 
imposing a constitutional ban on the introduction of same-sex marriage in 
the Croatian legal system.
As more than 700.000 signatures were collected by May 2013, the 
Sabor, (Parliament) voted in favor of holding a referendum, as per art. 87.3 
of the Constitution.
The constitutional popular consultation was held on 1st December 
2013, with very low popular participation: just 37.9% of the electorate 
indicated its preference. Yet, it was enough to make the referendum pass, 
with 66.28% saying yes46. Accordingly, art. 61.2 of the Croatian Constitution 
was amended thus: “Marriage is a living union between a woman and a 
man”47.
During the referendum campaign, concern about the constitutionality 
of the referendum per se started to grow in the Croatian public sphere, to the 
extent that the Parliament voted on a proposal to submit a request for the 
review of the constitutionality of the referendum to the Constitutional Court.
However, the majority of MPs voted against, and the Constitutional 
Court was not able to exercise its scrutiny.
However, while confirming the validity of the ballot48, the Court – 
taking the opportunity to state its own view – emphasized that inter alia, 
from the substantive law aspect, the Republic of Croatia legally recognized 
both marriage and common-law marriage, and same-sex unions (through 
unregistered same-sex unions introduced in 2003). Thus, Croatian law 
was aligned with the European legal standards regarding the institutions of 
45 The asked question was: Are you in favor of the constitution of the Republic of Croatia being amended with 
a provision stating that marriage is matrimony between a woman and a man?
46 Data concerning this popular vote can be found at http://c2d.ch/referendum/HR/5bbc030992a21351232 
e5775 (last retrieved on 10 September 2019).
47 R. PODOLNJAK, cit., p. 145 ss.
48 Decisionon the completion of the proceedings of supervision of the constitutionality and legality in 
implementing the national referendum held on 1 December 2013, decision No. SuP-O-1/2014 of 14 
January 2014, Official Gazette No. 5/14. English versions of decisions are available at: https://sljeme.usud.
hr/usud/prakswen.nsf/vPremaDatumuDonos.xsp (last retrieved on 9 September 2019) 
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marriage and family49. The Court stressed how it was“[...] necessary to point 
out the following: any supplementation of the Constitution by provisions 
according to which marriage is the living union of a woman and a man 
may not have any influence on the further development [since] everyone in 
the Republic of Croatia has the right to respect and legal protection of their 
personal and family life, and their human dignity”50.
Eventually, in 2014, the Life Partnership Act was passed by the 
Parliament with 89 votes for and 16 against. It was published in the official 
gazette on 28 July 2014, and took effect 8 days later (except for the part on 
parental responsibility which came into force on 1 September 2014).
2.3 Slovenia (2012-2015)
In Slovenia, same-sex partners have been granted legal recognition 
since 2005, according to the Registration of Same Sex Partnerships Act 
(Zakon o registraciji istospolne partnerske skupnosti – ZRIPS), which 
provided legal guarantees in terms of property rights, but excluded social 
security rights, i.e. pension rights.
In 2009, the Constitutional Court found the law on registered 
partnership in violation of the Constitution51 because it discriminated against 
partners on the basis of sexual orientation in the context of inheritance rights 
and other property rights. According to Slovenian constitutional judges – 
who decided unanimously by all nine – the situation of registered same-sex 
partners, in relation to the right to inheritance, was comparable with the 
situation of spouses. Hence, the Court gave the legislature six months to 
remedy this situation52.
The National Assembly started developing a new bill introducing a 
new family code. The 2011 bill expanded the existing same-sex registered 
partnerships rights, so that partners could have all the rights of married 
couples, except adoption (excluding step-child adoption).
49 Communication by the Constitutional Court of Croatia, No. SuS-1/2013 of 14 November 2013. English 
versions of decisions are available at: https://sljeme.usud.hr/usud/prakswen.nsf/vPremaDatumuDonos.xsp 
(last retrieved on 9 September 2019).
50 Ibidem, para. 12.
51 Constitutional Court of Slovenia, case U-I-425/06-10, Blazic and Kern v. Slovenia, 2010.
52 Ibidem.
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However, according to art. 90 of the Slovenian Constitution53, once 
a bill has been passed, it is possible – with some limitations – to seek an 
«adverse referendum», i.e. a referendum aimed at rejecting a draft bill under 
approval54.
The conservative group “Civil Initiative for the Family and the Rights of 
Children”, supported by the conservative-centrist Slovenian People’s Party, 
was able to collect the required signatures to force a referendum on the law.
As doubts were raised on the constitutionality of such a referendum, 
the Government referred the question to the Constitutional Court, which, 
eventually, decided on the admissibility of the popular consultation55.
With a turnout of 30.31% (no quorum was provided by art. 90 of the 
Constitution in its prior 2013 version) 54, 55% of voters agreed on rejecting 
the new family code56.
The Parliament, on 3 March 2015, approved a new bill redefining 
marriage as a «union of two». Immediately, conservative opponents mounted 
a campaign against this legislative reform, and gathered enough signatures 
to force a referendum.
The National Assembly reacted to this attempt to block this new piece 
of legislation, voting to block the referendum on the ground that it would 
violate the constitutional provision which prohibits popular votes on laws 
eliminating unconstitutionality in the field of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms (art. 90.2 of the Constitution). The proponents of the referendum 
appealed to the Constitutional Court.
Again, the Court was compelled to decide whether the popular 
vote was in violation of the Constitution, in particular with the revised 
version of art. 90.2 which explicitly forbids voting “on laws eliminating 
unconstitutionality in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms or 
any other unconstitutionality”. In its 2014 decision, the constitutional judges 
53 Art. 90 of the Slovenian Constitution allowed one third of the deputies (thus the parliamentary minority), the 
National Council, or forty thousand voters to call for an adverse referendum. After the 2013 constitutional 
reform, according to art. 90 of the Constitution, it is now possible to do so only by collecting forty thousand 
voters’ signatures.
54 This kind of referendum is provided only by the Danish and Slovenian Constitutions. See, R. PODOLNJAK, cit., 
p. 135 ss.
55 Slovenian Constitutional Court, case U-II-3/11. Translation in English is available at http://odlocitve.us-rs.si/
en/odlocitev/AN03521?q=U-II-3%2F11 (last retrieved on 13 September 2019).
56 Data concerning this popular vote can be found at http://c2d.ch/referendum/SI/5bbc01bb92a21351232e 
5593 (last retrieved on 10 September 2019).
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upheld that while “[i]n Slovenia power is vested in the people”57, in order to 
allow or dismiss an adverse referendum, the Court must establish whether 
the law passed by the Parliament is about “eliminating an unconstitutionality 
in the field of human rights”.
Following this line of reasoning, the Court went further to observe 
how it “has never established that the definition of marriage currently in 
force and the conditions for entering into marriage are unconstitutional”58. 
Hence, the new bill passed by the Parliament defining marriage as a «union 
of two» instead of a «union of a man and a woman» was not to be considered 
immune from a direct popular decision.
As in 2012, the popular participation was quite low (turnout 36, 
38%) but it reached the quorum – one fifth of all qualified voters have voted 
against the law (art. 90.4 of the Constitution) – and votes against the bill 
prevailed with 63, 51% of no59.
Finally, in 2016, the Parliament approved a new bill to grant same- 
-sex partnerships all rights of marriage, except joint adoption and in vitro 
fertilization.
2.4 Slovakia (2015)
No legal recognition is provided to same-sex unions in Slovakia, 
except for some rights granted to those unions legalized in another EU 
Member State, since the European Court of Justice ruled – in 2018 – that 
Members States must grant married same-sex couples, where at least one 
partner is an EU citizen, full residency rights, in light of Directive 2004/38/EC 
(Citizens’ Rights Directive or Free Movement Directive)60.
57 Slovenian Constitutional Court, case U-II-1/15, 28 September 2015, para. 31. Translation in English is 
available at http://odlocitve.us-rs.si/en/odlocitev/AN03847 (last retrieved on 13 September 2019).
58 Ibidem, para 52.
59 Data concerning this popular vote can be found at http://c2d.ch/referendum/SI/5caf179361af8403c235ddc9 
(last retrieved on 10 September 2019).
60 ECJ, Case C-673/16, Coman and Others v. Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări and Ministerul Afacerilor 
Interne. The Coman case, originated from a Romanian man seeking to have his marriage to an American man 
(a marriage celebrated in Belgium) recognized. Given the opposition of Romanian immigration authorities to 
provide a residence permit to the American partner, the case was brought before the Constitutional Court, 
which referred – for preliminary ruling under art. 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union– to the European Court of Justice. The EJC thus ruled in favor of the same-sex couples arguing that 
“in a situation in which a Union citizen has made use of his freedom of movement by moving to and taking 
up genuine residence, in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article 7(1) of Directive 2004/38/
EC [...], in a Member State other than that of which he is a national, and, whilst there, has created and 
strengthened a family life with a third-country national of the same sex to whom he is joined by a marriage 
lawfully concluded in the host Member State, Article 21(1) TFEU must be interpreted as precluding the 
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In addition, since 2018, ordinary legislation provides some inheritance 
rights to «close persons», i.e., brother, a sister, spouse or a person in a 
relationship; however, according to article 116 of the civil code, the life 
companions can be considered «close persons» under law only “if a 
detriment suffered by one of them is reasonably felt as own by the other”.
The Slovakian case is peculiar, since the Slovak Constitution provided 
for a specific ban on same-sex marriage (art. 41 of the Constitution).
Therefore, there was no (legal) need to further provide other possible 
limitations on LGBT couples’ rights. In addition, according to art. 93.3 of the 
Slovak Constitution, “[b]asic rights and freedoms [...] may not be the subject 
of a referendum”.
Despite that, the collection of signatures to initiate a referendum was 
started by the group named Alliance for Family, which was able to gather 
400, 000 signatures calling for a vote aimed at preventing a legalization of 
same-sex marriage and seeking the electorate’s opinion on three different 
interrogatives: (a) do you agree that only a bond between one man and one 
woman can be called marriage?; (b) do you agree that same-sex couples or 
groups should not be allowed to adopt and raise children? (c) do you agree 
that schools cannot require children to participate in education pertaining 
to sexual behavior or euthanasia if the children or their parents don’t agree?
Consequently, a complete list of stereotypes was provided at the 
ballot.
According to art. 95.2 of the Slovak Constitution, the Constitutional 
Court may review whether the subject (question) of the referendum conforms 
to the Constitution at the request of the President of the Republic, which the 
President did in this case.
The Court replied by arguing that “[t]he irrevocability of human rights 
means that the standard (level) of human rights as set in the constitutional 
text cannot be reduced. If the subject of a referendum would lead to the 
broadening of human rights, such a referendum would be constitutionally 
acceptable. If the subject of the referendum would reduce human rights to 
such a degree that it would jeopardize the nature of the rule of law, such 
competent authorities of the Member State of which the Union citizen is a national from refusing to grant 
that third-country national a right of residence in the territory of that Member State on the ground that the 
law of that Member State does not recognize marriage between persons of the same sex” (para 51).
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a referendum would not be constitutionally acceptable”61. Nonetheless, 
according to the Court, given that marriage in Slovakia is only between 
opposite sex partners, no rights can be reduced in the absence of rights62 
(i.e., though the right to marry is a human right, same-sex marriage is not, 
for now at least).
Interestingly, the referendum failed because of the low turnout, which 
was 21, 4% of the eligible voters, much less than the 50% required by 
art. 98 of the Slovak Constitution in order to obtain a legally valid result63.
2.5 Romania (2018)
Romania does not allow any legal recognition of same-sex partners. As 
far as LGBT people’s rights are concerned, Romania is one the last countries 
in all European statistics64.
Although the Constitution (art. 48.1) appears to be neutral – i.e. there is 
only a neutral reference to spouses – the law has been always interpreted as 
encompassing only the traditional definition of marriage65 given by the civil 
code on its art. 259 “Marriage shall be a freely consented union between a 
man and a woman, concluded under the law”.
Attempts to introduce a civil partnership have been made in 2013 
and 2014, but parliamentary opposition has always been strong on rejecting 
this66.
Though other legislative attempts have been made to introduce at 
least civil partnership, no legal recognition has been awarded to same-sex 
partners.
61 Constitutional Court of Slovakia, decision SVK-2014-3-003. English version of the summary is available at 
https://www.ustavnysud.sk/documents/10182/71853347/PL_24_2014.pdf/7042a660-ad01-4386-8f31-
865f459b8b75 (last retrieved on 12 September 2019).
62 Ibidem.
63 Data concerning this popular vote can be found at http://c2d.ch/referendum/SK/5bbc03cd92a21351232e58b7 
(last retrieved on 10 September 2019).
64 According to ILGA Europe Rainbow Map, Romania is 25thin the EU when it comes to respecting family life 
of LGBT people. Data are available at https://rainbow-europe.org/country-ranking#eu (last retrieved on 10 
October 2019).
65 D. KOCHENOV, U. BELAVUSAU, Same-sex spouses in the EU after Coman: More free movement, but 
what about marriage?, in European University Institute working paper, n. 3, 2019, p.3, available at 
https://cadmus.eui.eu/ (last retrieved on 10 October 2019).
66 See, V. ANDREESCU, Sexual Minorities, Civil Rights, and Romanians’ Resistance to Social Change, in 
AnALize: Revista de studii feministe, v. 10, n. 24, p. 38 ss. (available at: https://www.ceeol.com/search/
article-detail?id=701125, last retrieved on 12 October 2019).
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In 2018, a constitutional referendum was attempted to introduce a 
ban on same-sex marriage. However, despite proponents collecting over 
three million signatures67, substantially more than the 500, 000 required to 
initiate the process for a constitutional amendment referendum (art. 150.1 of 
the Romania Constitution), the effort to modify the Constitution failed, since 
the final turnout was only 21.1%68, below the required threshold of 30%69.
2.6 Taiwan (2019)
In May 2017, the Constitutional Court of Taiwan (namely the Judicial 
Yuan)70 ruled that those civil code provisions preventing a same-sex partner 
from entering into marriage were in violation of the Taiwanese Constitution. 
According to the Court, the guarantees and freedoms enshrined in the 
constitutional text require marriage to be open on equal basis regardless of 
sexual orientation. According to the Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748 the 
ban on same-sex marriage in Taiwan’s civil code was “in violation of both 
the peoples’ freedom of marriage as protected by Article 22 and the people’s 
right to equality as guaranteed by Article 7 of the Constitution”71.
67 The referendum followed a citizens’ initiative launched by Coaliția pentru Familie (the Coalition for Family) 
in late 2015. Thus, following a successful citizens’ initiative, the Romanian government announced a 
referendum. The Chamber of Deputies approved the initiative on 9 May 2017, in a 232-22 vote, but the 
referendum was conducted on 6 and 7 October 2018. See, D. KOCHENOV, U. BELAVUSAU, cit., p. 4 ss.
68 Data concerning this popular vote can be found at http://c2d.ch/referendum/RO/5d24a16cdc0aeb467bfcc132 
(last retrieved on 10 September 2019).
69 Given art. 73.3 of the Romanian Constitution, the organic Law n. 341/2013 (which has modified the 
previous organic law n. 3/2000), establishes that the validity of a national referendum will be conditional on 
the fulfillment of two conditions: a turn-out quorum (minimum percentage) of at least 30% of the persons 
registered on the permanent electoral lists and at least 25% valid votes of voters registered on the permanent 
electoral lists. Since according to regulations the turn-out quorum does not distinguish between the types of 
referendum mentioned in the Constitution, it means that it is applicable to all types of national referendums. 
See, M. SAFTA, National Referendum. Existing regulatory framework and future perspective, in Juridical 
Tribune, v. 4, n. 1, 2014, p. 56 ss.
70 According to Taiwanese scholars, the Taiwanese Constitutional Court (TCC) could only partially be considered 
a judicial body of specialized constitutional review rooted in the Civil Law tradition, similar to those familiar 
to a European scholar. Indeed, its official designation, the Council of Grand Justices, suggests something 
else. When created, the TCC was not obliged to hold any public oral hearings (prior to 1993). Thereafter, 
things have changed when the constitutional amendment (additional article of 1992) was approved, which 
first provided for TCC jurisdiction on the dissolution of unconstitutional parties, namely, political parties that 
were judged to endanger the free and democratic constitutional order. That constitutional provision (currently 
Amendment V, section 4) was later implemented through the Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Act 
(CIPA), which replaced its predecessor, the Council of Grand Justices Act of 1958, in 1993. It is important 
to underline how the last constitutional amendment of 2005 further provides for TCC jurisdiction on the 
trial of the President and the vice-President with the “judicialization” of (vice) presidential impeachment 
process. See, SEE J-Y. HWANG, M-S. KUO, H-W. Chen, The clouds are gathering”: Developments in Taiwanese 
constitutional law: The year 2016 in review, in International Journal of Constitutional Law, v. 15, n. 3, 2017, 
p. 753-762.
71 In Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748, 2017, the Court has pointed out how “[...] the five classifications of 
impermissible discrimination set forth [in] Article 7 are only illustrative, rather than exhaustive. Therefore, 
different treatment based on other classifications, such as disability or sexual orientation, shall also be 
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In this landmark decision72. The Court gave the legislature (the 
Legislative Yuan) two years73 to amend the civil code.
In February 2018, a Taiwanese conservative Christian group opposing 
same-sex marriage74 (the Alliance for Next Generation’s Happiness) 
proposed different popular initiatives, collecting signatures to allow citizens 
to vote on this issue75. The declared aim was to overturn the ruling by the 
Constitutional Court76.
In response to this campaign against same-sex marriage recognition, 
LGBT activists collected enough signatures to submit their own claims for 
popular consultation77.
The Central Election Commission (CEC) approved all the proposals78. 
On 24 November 2018, Taiwanese voters approved the two initiatives 
against the legalization of same-sex marriage, thus rejecting the pro-LGBT 
initiative by wide margins79.
governed by the right to equality under the said Article”. This decision, translated in English, is available 
at: http://cons.judicial.gov.tw/jcc/en-us/jep03/show?expno=748 (last retrieved on 10/09/2019). See, D. 
KC Huang, The Court and the legalisation of same-sex marriage: a critical analysis of the Judicial Yuan 
interpretation, in University of Pennsylvania Asian Law Review, v. 14, 2019, p. 63 ss.
72 See, M-S. KUO, H-W.CHEN, The Brown Moment in Taiwan: Making Sense of the Law and Politics of the 
Taiwanese Same-Sex Marriage Case in a Comparative Light, in Columbia Journal of Asian Law, v. 31, 2017, 
p. 73-146.
73 As the Taiwanese Court stated: “The authorities concerned shall amend or enact the laws as appropriate, 
in accordance with the ruling of this Interpretation, within two years from the announcement of this 
Interpretation. It is within the discretion of the authorities concerned to determine the formality for achieving 
the equal protection of the freedom of marriage. If the authorities concerned fail to amend or enact the 
laws as appropriate within the said two years, two persons of the same sex who intend to create the said 
permanent union shall be allowed to have their marriage registration effectuated at the authorities in charge 
of household registration, by submitting a written document signed by two or more witnesses in accordance 
with the said Marriage Chapter”. Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748, 2017.
74 M.-S. Ho, Taiwan’s Road to Marriage Equality: Politics of Legalizing Same-sex Marriage, in The China 
Quarterly, v. 238, 2019, p. 482-503.
75 The two relevant questions were: (i) Do you agree with using means other than the marriage regulations in 
the civil code to protect the rights of two people of the same gender to build a permanent life together?; 
(ii) Do you agree that the marriage regulations in the civil code should define marriage as between a man 
and a woman?..
76 See, to have insight on how media have described this movement, https://www.taiwangazette.org/
news/2018/10/5/who-is-behind-taiwans-opposition-to-same-sex-marriage-and-why-are-they-so-afraid.
77 The relevant question was: Do you agree that the Civil Code marriage regulations should be used to guarantee 
the rights of same sex couples to get married?
78 J.M.K. CHO, L.Y.L KAM, Same-Sex Marriage in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan: Ideologies, Spaces and 
Developments, in F.L. Yu, D. KWAN(eds.) Contemporary Issues in International Political Economy, Palgrave 
Macmillan, Singapore, 2019, p. 289 ss.
79 The two «against questions» obtained respectively 72,48% and 61,12% support; the in «favor question» 
failed with 67,26% of votes. Data concerning this popular vote can be found at https://web.archive.org/
web/20181124220825/http://referendum.2018.nat.gov.tw/pc/en (last retrieved on 10 September 2019).
RDP Nº 98 – Mar-Abr/2021 – ASSUNTO ESPECIAL ..............................................................................................................................195 
RDP, Brasília, Volume 18, n. 98, 176-198, mar./abr. 2021
Interestingly, one week before the vote, the Taiwanese government 
announced that the Constitutional Court ruling would be respected regardless 
of the referendum results.
Therefore, despite the outcome of popular vote, on 20 February 
2019, the Executive Yuan presented a draft bill – Act for Implementation 
of J. Y. Interpretation No. 748-80 – allowing same-sex partners to create a “a 
permanent union of intimate and exclusive nature for the purpose of living a 
common life” (art. 2). This new piece of legislation covers inheritance rights, 
medical rights, and adoption of the biological children of their partner.
Penalties for adultery and bigamy are provided, similar to opposite-
sex marriages. This new legislation does not amend the existing marriage 
laws in the civil code, but creates a separate law. In other words, the idea of 
policy makers was somehow to respect the outcome of the 2018 referendum, 
while, at the same time, respecting the Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748, 
by creating a legal institution which is de facto identical to marriage.
3 CONCLUSION
Only in two of the analyzed case studies, namely California and Taiwan, 
the use of direct democratic process has resulted in popular participation 
above 50 % of the total number of potential voters. This seems to confirm 
the assumption that, in general, if popular initiatives or referendums become 
very frequent, popular participation tends to decrease81.
In addition, in all the analyzed cases, people have voted against the 
option of introducing legal provisions introducing same-sex marriage. As 
has been described, in the case of Croatia, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia, 
even when parliaments have displayed readiness to address LGBT rights, 
they have been hindered or constrained through direct democracy devices 
promoted by conservative electoral social minorities82.
80 Available at: https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=B0000008 (retrieved on 10.09.2019).
81 M. FREITAG, I. STADELMANN-STEFFEN, Stumbling block or stepping stone? The influence of direct 
democracy on individual participation in parliamentary elections, in Electoral Studies, v. 29, n. 3, 2010, 
p. 472 ss.
82 Indeed, by considering ballot turnouts, it is evident that results have been determined by conservative 
minoritarian part of voters. In fact, considering the total amount of registered voters, those determining ballot 
results were: (a) the 24,96% of potential voters in the Croatian 2013 referendum); (b) the 16,37% of 
potential voters in the Slovenian 2012 referendum, and the 22, 99% in the 2015 referendum; the 20,23% 
of potential voters in the Slovakian 2015 referendum. These data are available at http://c2d.ch/ (retrieved on 
10.12.2019).
196    ..........................................................................................................................RDP Nº 98 – Mar-Abr/2021 – ASSUNTO ESPECIAL
RDP, Brasília, Volume 18, n. 98, 176-198, mar./abr. 2021
Interestingly, both in California and Taiwan, popular vote confirmed 
the existence of a gap between voters’ attitude towards minority rights and 
judges’ decisions. Courts seem to face the so-called «counter-majoritarian 
difficulty»83, with no particular trouble in dealing with sexual minorities’ 
fundamental rights.
However, in these two case studies, a distinction must be drawn: 
while in California, Proposition n. 8 has been struck down after the ballot, 
challenging the legitimacy of Proposition itself vis-à-vis the Constitution, in 
Taiwan, the decision taken by the majority of voters was delivered after the 
decision of the Judicial Yuan.
Thus, if on the one hand supreme justices seem to be able to play 
their role as guardians of fundamental constitutional freedoms despite the 
actual feeling of the people (either before or after a ballot), on the other 
hand, it seems reasonable to affirm that popular vote, i.e. the allocation 
of preferences, does not seem to be influenced/shaped by authoritative 
decisions such as those from a Constitutional Court.
In both the Californian and Taiwanese cases, the potential conflict 
between popular sovereignty and constitutional guarantees appear evident, 
throwing up a highly challenging question to be answered concerning direct 
democracy: is it possible to simply discharge a clear-cut popular decision? 
In this context, it might be argued that constitutions are there to limit powers, 
and «the people power» is not exempt from constitutional constraints84.
The Taiwanese legislature had somehow to reconcile two opposite 
positions (judicial v. popular), and it did so, bypassing (ideally) this problem 
by adopting a legislation introducing same-sex partnership (instead of same-
sex marriage), granting rights and obligations overlapping those provided 
for the civil marriage, but maintaining a distinction between the two legal 
institutions.
83 See, N. SULTANY, The State of Progressive Constitutional Theory: The Paradox of Constitutional Democracy and 
the Project of Political Justification, in Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, v. 47, 2012, p. 373 
ss.; B. Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 
in New York University Law Review, 1998, p. 333 ss.; W. MISHLER, R. S. SHEEHAN, The Supreme Court as 
a Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, in The American 
Political Science Review, v. 87, n. 1, 1993, p. 87 ss.
84 J. E. CASTELLO, The Limits of Popular Sovereignty: Using the Initiative Power to Control Legislative Procedure, 
in California Law Review, v. 74, n. 2, p. 504 ss.;B.Caravita, I circuiti plurali della decisione nelle democrazie 
moderne, in Federalismi.it, numero speciale 1, 2017, p. 5 ss.; S. Bowler, When Is It OK to Limit Direct 
Democracy?, in Minnesota Law Review, v. 97, 2013, p. 1781 ss.
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In addition, given the counter-minoritarian attitude of voters, this 
brings us to what I call a democratic «counter-minoritarian dilemma», 
whenever direct democracy is used to decide over/against minorities’ rights, 
especially in cases in which the targeted groups are associated with negative 
social stereotypes.
This lack of empathy toward minority rights could be related to the 
idea that rights of minorities represent, somehow, a threat for the others.
In Croatia, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia, the turnout in ballots 
limiting LGBT rights was below 40%, with Slovakia’s percentage being 
just 21.4% of voters. Hence, it is evident that the majority of the voters 
simply ignored the ballot, allowing conservative voters to achieve their goals 
easily. This «popular indifference» must be taken into due consideration, 
and possible solutions need to be investigated in order not to compromise 
minority groups’ rights.
One possible solution could be found in the introduction of a 
«constitutional irrevocability of human rights clause» better framed then the 
one enshrined in art. 93.3 of the Slovakian Constitution, thereof reconsidering 
the issue of social minorities, and imposing the adoption of the principle of 
non-discrimination in the analysis of the validity of the proposed referendum.
Indeed, used as a possible limitation of direct democracy, a generic 
reference to “human rights” does not seem to configure a real safeguard, 
given the room for interpretation (as shown in the Slovakian case study). The 
adoption of the principle of non-discrimination could give judges the option 
to scrutinize proposals of referendum using a strict scrutiny approach, as 
happens with ordinary legislation passed by parliaments.
To address the issue of the «voting social minority» being able to 
decide – outnumbering it –the rights of another (smaller) social minority, the 
introduction of higher quorums of voters might discourage an abuse of direct 
democracy devices against minorities. Indeed, given the number of voters, 
this seems to be the most efficient way to avoid the tyranny of conservative 
minorities over the LGBT minority (or other possible minorities). In other 
words, what I called the democratic «counter-minoritarian dilemma» could 
be – if not totally – at least partially solved through a higher quorum required 
to validate direct voting.
Which is the right quorum? This is an issue that remains open to future 
investigation.
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